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organization, the property should be divided between them in proportion
-to their numbers at the time of the separation.
8. Members who secede thereby forfeit all right to any part of the
property rights or privileges or a church or society.
9. Deists, theists, free religionists and other infidels, though they may
be Unitarians in some sense, are not Unitarian Christians.
The case, which is too long for even a full abstract here, will be reported
in 53 N. H.
NATIONAL BANK -LIEN ON SToCK.-In Re Mo1rison, the United
States District Court, East. District of Missouri, TREAT, J., held that
a by-law of a bank restraining the transfer of stock by a stockholder
who is indebted in any way to the bank, creates a valid lien in favor
of the bank, and is not prohibited by 35th see. of Bankrupt Act.
SUNDAY.-LEGAL PROCEEDINGS.-In Langaber v. Fai"bury, &e., R.
R. Co., the Supreme Court of Illinois held, that in certain cases a bill
in chancery may be filed, and an injunction issued and served on Sunday.
That anciently courts of justice did sit on Sunday; that the early
Christians of the sixth century and before used all days alike for the
hearing of cases, not sparing Sunday itself; but in the year 517 a canon
was promulgated exempting Sundays, and other canons were afterwards
adopted exempting other days, which were all adopted by the Saxon
Kings; and all confirmed by William the Conqueror and Henry the
Second, and in that way became a part of the common law of England ;
that by these canons other days were declared unjudicial, as the Day
of the Purification of the Blessed Virgin Mary, the Feast of the As-
cension, the Feast of St. John the Baptist, and All Saints and All Souls
days. These were as much unjudicial days as Sunday, yet the most
devoted admirer of the common law would not hesitate to say that the
proceedings'of a court of justice in this state on either of those days
would be valid. See the opinion of the court in full in 6 Chicago Legal
News, No. 24.
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ENGLISH COURTS.
SUPREME COURT OF TIIE UNITED STATES.'
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN.
2
ACTION.
Debtor and Creditor-Pledge of Collateras-Collection of more than
his Debt by the Creditor.-The complaint avers, in substance, that plain-
tiff transferred to defendant notes and mortgages to secure a debt due
the latter, and defendant agreed to use due diligence in the collection
thereof, to retain out of the proceeds the amount of such debt, with costs
and expenses of collectiQn, and to pay the surplus to plaintiff; that de-
fendant made such collections; and that, after deducting the amount of
such debt, costs and expenses, he has a certain surplus in his hands, for
I From J. W. Wallace, Esq., Reporter; to appear in vol. 19 of his Reports.
2 From Hon. 0. M. Conover, Reporter; to appear in 34 Wisconsin Reports.
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which judgment is demanded. Held, that a cause of action at law is
stated, and not one in equity for an accounting: Dickson v. Cole, 34 Wis.
If deicodant took from the mortgagor a conveyance of the premises
described in one of' such mortgages, and released the mortgage-debt with-
out any agreement with the plaintiff in regard thereto, he is liable to ac-
count to plaintiff fbr the amount of such debt : Id.
ADMIRALTY.
]Practice-AppI~ealfrom District Court.-An appeal in admiralty from
the District to the Circuit Court in effect vacates the decree of the Dis-
trict Court, and a new trial in all respects, and a new decree, are to be
had in the Circuit Court. The latter must execute its own decree, and
the District Court has nothing more to do with the case : The Lucille,
19 Wall.
An order of the Circuit Court merely affirming the decree of the Dis-
trict Court, and nothing more, is not such a decree as the Circuit Court
should render, and is not a final decree from which an appeal lies to this
court : d.
BAILMENT.
Banker's Lien-Deposit of Box containing Securities. -Boxes col-
taining securities were deposited with a banking firm for safe-keeping;
they were gratuitous bailees. Held, that they had no lien on the secu-
rities for a balance due to them on their accounts with the owner of the
securities. The defendants relied on the general doctrine of the banker's
lien upon all securities coming into their possession as bankers; and
urged that the boxes came into their possession as bankers because it is
the custom for London banks to receive boxes in that way for safe-keep-
ing ; but they fiAled to prove that in such cases a lien had been asserted:
Leese v. Martin, 29 L. T. N. S. 742.
BANK. See Bailment; Insolvent.
Prohibition to hold Real Estate-Taking land through i Trustee as
Securityfor a Debt.--Although a bank by statute, or the trustees, on the
expiration thereof, who liquidate its affairs, may be deprived of power
to-take or hold real estate, this does not prevent either's making an ar-
rangement through the medium of a trustee, by which, without ever
having a legal title, control or ownership of such estate, they jet secure
a debt for which they had a lien on such estate, and have the'estpte sold
so as to pay the debt: Zantzingers v. Gunton, 19 Wall.
BILLS AND NOTES.
Bill of Ladintg-Acceptance-Misreresentation.-The Union Bank
of London presented a bill of exchange to Baxter & Co., the drawees,
for their aceeptance, accompanied by a ticket representing that the bank
held bills of lading to cover it. Baxter & Co. thereupon accepted the
bill in reliance upon this statement. Both parties believed the bills of
lading to be genuine, but in reality they had been forged by the drawer
of. the bill of exchange. Held, that Baxter &-Co. were not entitled to
demand from the bank genuine bills of lading before paying the amount
of the bill of exchange. The V.-C. said that unless there was a rep-
resentation by the Union Bank that they held good bills of lading the
plaintiff's case must fail. (V.-C. BACON) : Baxter v. Chiapman, 29 L.
T. N. S. 642.
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CHURCIt PROPERTY. See Equity.
CONTRACT.'
Delivery of Goods sold after the -Stipmlatel The-Acceptnce-
aticver.-The Act of June 1862, requiring contracts tior military
supplies to be in writing, is not infringed by the proper officer having
charge of such matter accepting delivery of such supplies after the day
stipulated, nor is a verbal agreement to extend the time of performanee
invalid : Saloon v. United States, 19 Wall.
When, under a written contract, made by a person to deliver such
supplies as, ex. yr., corn at. one time fixed, the quartermaster in charge
receives part of the corn from such person for the government, and then
at a later date, no objection being nmde to the delay, receives the rest,
and gives a receipt and voucher for the amount and the price, and the
government uses such part of it as it wants, and suffers the remainder
to decay by exposure and neglect, there is an implied contract to pay
the value of such corn, which value may, in the absence of other testi-
mony, be presumed to be the price fixed in the voucher by the quarter-
master: .Id.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See Insolvent.
DAMAGES.
Loss of Profits-Extra Expenses.-A. contracted with the government
to transport a large quantity of army supplies, the government agreeing
that in order that he should be in readiness to meet its demands fbr
transportation due notice should be given to him of the quantity to be
transported at any one time. The government gave him notice that
transportation would be required at a time named for a certain large
amount of supplies specified, and inquired if he would get ready. lie
replied affirmatively, and did get ready. The government at the time
named furnished a small part of the supplies of which they had given
notice to the contractor, but not needing transportation for the much
larger residue did not furnish that. On'suit by the contractor against
the government for profits which he would have made had the supplies
been furnished as he received notice that they would be, Held, that the
notice did not amount to an agreement to furnish the amount of sup-
plies specified, and therefore that the contractor could not recover the
profits which he would have made had the freights withheld been fur-
nished to him: Bulkliy v. Mited States, 19 Wall.
Held, further, that the government having thrown upon him needless
expense by requiring him to make ready for the transportation of freights
under the contract, which they did not in the end require to be trans-
ported, he was entitled to recover for the expense to which he wus thus
subjected: Id.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Insolvent.
DEED.
Voluntary Settlement- Words of Limitation in Grant-Life Estate.-
Robert Middleton settled freeholds, in 1838, in tru-t for himself for life,
and after his death in trust for his reputed son William, when and in
case he attained twenty-one, with a trust for maintenance in case W.
should be under twenty-one at the settlor's death. And in case W.
should die under twenty-one, or should die in the settlor's lifetime with-
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out issue, then over. There were no words of limitation in the trust for
W. There was a power ofsale in the settlement, but no power to con-
vert the proceeds into land. The settler died in 1849, having made his
will in 1843, which recited the settleztent and confirmed it. W.
attained twenty-one, and died in 1872. held, that W. took a life estate
only in the freehdld'under the settlement, and that there was a resulting
trust for the settlor. It was urged for the defendant that the intention
of the settler was clear ; that if the power of sale had been exercised the
proceeds would have been held as money, and have gone to the defend-
ant : that the will confirmed the settlement, and the words of the set-
tlenent, if used in a will, would have passed a fee: but the V.-. said
lie should be striving against the strength of the law if he decided
against the plaintiff. The intention of the settlor had been disappointed
by the means which he took to effect it. The will did not advance the
defendant's case : it confirmed but did not alter the settlement: Middle-
ton v. Barker, 29 L. T. N. S. 643.
EQUITY.
Church Property-Interference with-Injunction.-In an action brought
in the name of a religious society incorporated under the statute, the
complaint avers (in substance) that defendants have secretly and fraltd-
ulently obtained possession of the church edifice, have put new locks and
keys on the door thereof, and, refusing to admit the plaintiff by its reg-
ularly elected and qualified trustees and officers and members, have kept
forcible possession of such edifice; that they have secretly possessed them.
selves of a portion of the church records, and kept the plaintiff, its trus-
tees, officers and members, from access thereto and possession thereof;
and that they threaten to take unlawful possession of the remaining
records, and of all the temporalities of the plaintiff, including the par-
sonage. Held, that the complaint states a good cause of action for an
injunction : Lutheran Ev. Cliurch v. Grstaut and others, 34 Wis.
By an injunction restraining defendants from further interfering with
the property and temporalities of the society, the plaintiff, by its trustees,
officers and members, may be restored to the peaceful possession of its
rights, without any further order of the court, except a special order re-
quiring defendants to restore that portion of the records of the society
which they have taken: T1.
EVIDENCE. See FaT6e Imprisonment.
Proof of Handwriting.-The agent for this state of a defendant com-
pahy testified that he knew the general superintendent of the company,
had been in correspondence with him for a year and a half on business
of the company, knew nothing about his handwriting except in this way,
and thought the signature to a certain letter purporting to be written by
said general superintendent to said witness, offered in evidence by plain-
tiff, was genuine. Held, that this was sufficient proof of the genuineness
of the letter to entitle it to be received in evidence : Smith and others v.
Amazon Ins. Co., 31 Wis.
FALSE IMPRISONMENT.
Evidence-Bad Character of Plaintifl-Pleading.-The female plain-
tiff was arrested under a warrant, upon a charge of larceny preferred by
defendant, and was held in jail until produced before a justice. In an
action for damages for such arrest and imprisonment as unlawful, the
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answer being a general denial : I1edd, that it was not error to exclude
testimony offered by defendant to show that the reputation of the female
plaintiff in her neighborhood, in respect to theft, was bad before the ar-
rest was made: Scheer v. Kecoon, 34 Wis.
If defendant relied on plaintiff's bad reputation in the particular men-
tioned as one of the circumstances going to establish a defence by show-
ing that he had reasonable ground to suspect her of the larceny charged.
he should have set it up in his ansiwer. B- v. I-, 22 Wis. 372. and
Wilson v. Aloonan (unreported), distinguished : Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Effect of Subsequent Adultery on Deed of Separation.-Where a
husband, by a deed of separation between himself and his wife, cov-
enanted to pay an annuity to trustees for her use during the joint lives
of husband and wife, "and during so long time as they shall live sepa-
rate and apart," a divorce obtained for the subsequent adultery of the
wife, is no answer to an action by the trustees for arrears of the annuity,
in the absence of an express proviso in the deed; the covenant being
absolute and unconditional to pay the annuity so long as the two
"should live separate and apart;" BaAMWELL, B., saying, " We are
asked to import a condition into this deed to the effect that in case the
marriage between the defendant and his wife should be dissolved, then
the defendant is to be freed from further liability on his covenant. * * *
There can be no doubt that it was intended by the deed to arrange a
separation, once for all, between the man and his wife. * * * The wife
gave up certain advantages, at the time she agreed to the separation,
and we ought not now to attach any new term or condition to this
deed." (Exch.) : Charlesworth v. Holt 29 L. T. N. S. 647 ; s. c. L. R. 9
Exch. 38.
Marriage Settlement- Covenant to settle 4'fe's after-acquired Property
-Property acquired after 11usband's Death excluded.-In a marriage
settlement, a covenant by husband and wife to settle after-acquired
property of the wife does not extend to property to which the wife be-
conies entitled after the death of her husband, but only to property ac-
quired during the coverture, although there be no word in the covenant
restricting it to property during the coverture. Lord Justice JAMES:
"The object of such a settlement as that in question is to bring into
the settlement property of the wife to which the husband's marital right
would otherwise attach. Property of the wife acquired after the hus-
band's death does not come within the reason of the covenant :" Re
Edwards, 29 L. T. N. S. 712; s. c. L. R. 9 Ch. App. 97.
INJUNCTION. See Equity.
INSOLVENT.
Application of Assets-State cannot appropriate Asscts of a State
Bank to ihjury of other Creditors.-Though the stock of a bank be al-
together owned by a state, if the bank is insolvent its assets cannot be
appropriated by legislative act or otherwise to pay the debts of the
state, as distinguished from the debts of the bank. Those assets are a
trust fund first applicable to the payment of the debts of the bank
Barings v. Dabney, 19 Wall.
* An act of the legislature requiring the managers of an insolvent bank
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belonging to the state to hold its assets appropriated to the payment of
certain specified debts, creates a trust in iivor of the creditors holding
said debts, and, if assented to by them, amounts to a contract with them
to carry out said trust: Id.
If such an act, however, has the effect to appropriate the assets of the
bank to pay the debts of the state, to the prejudice of billholders and
other creditors of the bank, it is repugnant to that clause of the con-
stitution which prohibits a law impairing the obligation of contracts,
and is void: Id.
JUDGMENT.
Action on Judyment in another tate-Defence.-A return to a sum-
mons by the sheriff that he has served the defendant personally there-
with is sufficient, without stating that the service was made in his
county. This will be presumed: Knowles v. The Gaslight and Coke
Co., 19 Wall.
But, in an action on a judgment rendered in other state, the defend.
ant, notwithstanding the record shows a return of the sheriff that he
was personally served with process, may show the contrary, namely, that
he was not served, and that the court never acquired jurisdiction of his
person. The case of Thompson v. Whitman (18 Wallace 457), af-
firmed and applied: Id.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
Claim under Sheriff's Deed-Regularity of Proceedings.-Where the'
occupant of land entered into possession under claim of title exclusive
of any other right, founding such claim upon a sheriff's deed upon a
sale on execution against the original owner, and had been in continual
occupation of the premises tinder such claim for ten years, and had cul-
tivated and improved the land and protected itby a substantial enclosure
during the whole of that period: Held, that a action, by the original
owner, or one claiming under him (in this case a mortgagee), to assert
- his right to the land, was barred by the statute: North v. Hammer, 84
Wis.
If, by reason of defects in the proceedings, the title of the judgment
debtor was not in fact divested by the sale on execution, this does not
affect the application of the statute: Id.
NUISANCE.
Navigable.Ricer-Obstruction.-In Rex v. Russel, 6 B. & C. 566
some staiths had been erected on the Tyne, and in a suit against the
owner, Mr. Justice B3AYLEY charged the jury that if, by means of the
staiths, coal was brought to market chedper and better than it otherwise
could have been brought, the public benefit might countervail the injury
to individuals.. This broad doctrine has been much criticised, and may
be considered as finally overturned by the late case of Attorney-General
v. Terry; where the M. R. (Sir GEORGE JESSEL) declared that on two
points the charge of Mr. Justice BAYLEY was erroneous. The benefit
to the public must be a benefit to the public frequenting that port; and
it must be a direct benefit. This latter adjective he explains by the
cases of straightening a tidal harbor, and of bridging a navigable river.
.ield therefore, in the case before him, that the erection being for the
purposes of the defendant's trade, it was too remote a benefit to the pub-
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lie, and that the injunction must be granted : Attorney. General v Terry,
29 L. T. N. S. 716.
SALE.
Bill of gale- Covenant topay "imnmefiately on dtiniand"-Reason-
able time for Payment.-By a bill of sale dated the 15th April 187:3,
the plaintiff assigned all his goods to the defendant to secure a sun of
1001., upon the express condition that if the plaintiff did not "imniedi-
ately upion demand thereof in writing" delivered to the plaintiff or leFt
for him at his home, pay the amount due, it should be lawful for the de-
fendant to seize and sell the goods compr'ised in the bill of sale. On
April 22d the defendant went with bailiffs to the plaintiff's house and
there saw plaintiff's wife and son, who told him plaintiff was from home,
they knew not where, and that he might be gone to America for aught
they knew. The defendant then read and delivered to the wife and son
a written demand for payment, which not being complied with, he at
once put the bailiffs into possession, and after eight days sold the goods.
The plaintiff returned to his home on May 8th and said he had started
with the 10C1, to go to S. on business, but had gone to R., had got drunk,
and remained away "on a spree." In an action against defendant for
the seizure and sale, Held, that the defendant was justified- in his ac-
tion. It was urged for the plaintiff that " immediately upon demand"?
always implies in law a reasonable notice, which had not in this case
been given; and Toms v. Wilson, 7 L. T. Rep. N. S. 421, and Massey
v. Sladen, L. Rep. 4 Ex. 13, were cited. But the court, admitting that
"even when so strong a word as ' immediately,' or ' instantly' or, if it be
possible, any stronger word in the language be used, there must still be
allowed a reasonable time," thought that the defendant had acted rea-
sonably. Per KELLY, C. B., that such a demand may be satisfied by
drawing a check, and time must be allowed for the debtor to cash it; but
per BRAIMWELL, B., dubitatur (Exch.) : Wharlton v. Kirkwood, 29 L. T.
N. S. 644.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSES.
Mines excepted out of Grant of Surface-Right of Owner of Surface
to Subterranean Water.-In a case in which mines were altogether ex-
cepted out of a demise of the surface, HeMl, that the rights of the
owner of the surface and the owner of the mines did not in any way
differ from those of the owners of adjacent closes, who are strangers in
title; each of'whom is entitled to the water found on his land, but
neither of whom is entitled to complain of the loss of that water by
natural percolation set in .motion by his neighbor's excavations; foir it*
makes no difference whether the respectiv closes are adjacent literally
or vertically, and the grant of the surface cannot carry with it more
than the ownership of the entire soil would. Lord PENZAN CE: t- To
hold otherwise might not improbably result in rendering the reservation
of mines and minerals wholly useless. Percolation of water into mines
to some extent is an almost necessary incident of mining. And if the
grant of the surface carries with it a right to be protected from any loss
of surface-water by this percolation, the owner of the surface would
hold the owner of the mines at his mercy." (Privy Council): Balla-
corkish Mining Co. v. Harrison, 29 L. T. N. S. 658; s. c. L. R. 5 P
C. 49.
-592
